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Abstract—Malware is a burgeoning threat for smartphones. It can surreptitiously access sensitive services on a phone without
the user’s consent, thus compromising the security and privacy of the user. The problem is exacerbated especially in the
context of emerging payment applications, such as NFC services. Traditional defenses to malware, however, are not suitable
for smartphones due to their resource intensive nature. This necessitates the design of novel mechanisms that can take into
account the specifics of the smartphone malware and smartphones themselves.
In this paper, we introduce a lightweight permission enforcement approach – Tap-Wave-Rub (TWR) – for smartphone malware
prevention. TWR is based on simple human gestures that are very quick and intuitive but less likely to be exhibited in users’
daily activities. Presence or absence of such gestures, prior to accessing an application, can effectively inform the OS whether
the access request is benign or malicious. Specifically, we present the design of two mechanisms: (1) accelerometer-based
phone tapping detection; and (2) proximity sensor based finger tapping, rubbing or hand waving detection. The first mechanism
is geared for NFC applications, which usually require the user to tap her phone with another device. The second mechanism
involves very simple gestures, i.e., tapping or rubbing a finger near the top of phone’s screen or waving a hand close to the phone,
and broadly appeals to many applications (e.g., SMS). In addition, we present the TWR-enhanced Android permission model,
the prototypes implementing the underlying gesture recognition mechanisms, and a variety of novel experiments to evaluate
these mechanisms. Our results suggest the proposed approach could be very effective for malware detection / prevention, with
quite low false positives and false negatives, while imposing little to no additional burden on the users.
Index Terms—malware; mobile devices; NFC; context recognition; sensors
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are undoubtedly becoming ubiquitous. They
are not only used as (traditional) mobile phones for phone
calling and SMS messaging, but also for many of the same
purposes as desktop computers, such as web browsing,
social networking, online shopping and banking. Also,
smartphones are incorporating more and more sensors and
communication interfaces. Such new capabilities enable
smartphones with many new unique functionalities that
desktop computers lack. For example, many smartphones
are beginning to incorporate Near Field Communication
(NFC) chips [28], which allows short, paired transactions
with other NFC-enabled devices in close proximity. The
use of NFC-equipped smartphones as payment tokens (such
as Google Wallet) is considered to be the next generation
payment system and the latest buzz in the financial industry
[10].
Tap, Wave and Rub is a magical trick [2]. In this paper, these “magical”
gestures are shown to provide an effective defense to the prevailing
problem of mobile phone malware.
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Due to their popularity, smartphones are becoming a
burgeoning target for malicious activities. There has been a
rapid increase in mobile phone malware targeting different
smartphone platforms [19], [21], [20], [35], [9], [33], [27],
[31]. After infecting a phone, malware can gain access
to sensitive resources / services on the phone for various
purposes, such as stealing user data, making premium
phone calls or SMS, damaging the device, tracking user’s
activities or location, or simply annoying the user.
Newer functionalities of smartphones only make them
more attractive to malware writers. For example, the incor-
poration of NFC chips on smartphones provides malware
authors another (possibly much easier) way to deploy their
attacks through the NFC interface [32]. Especially, due to
the ease with which financial transactions can take place
using NFC, it is predicted that NFC will become a popular
target for malware aiming at credential and credit card theft
[22]. Indeed, a proof-of-concept Trojan Horse electronic
pickpocket program under the cover of a tic-tac-toe game
has already been developed by Identity Stronghold [5]. In
this attack, the game containing the malware is downloaded
and installed on a NFC-enabled smartphone. Once activated
(when the game is played), the malware accesses the NFC
chip and enables the RFID (Radio Frequency ID) reading
functionality. This reader then surreptitiously scans tags
(e.g. RF tagged credit card) around it and reports the
acquired information to the malware owner through e-mail
once a victim tag is found in proximity.
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While the security community has been battling with PC
malware for many years, malware detection on smartphones
turns out to be an even more challenging problem [8]. This
is partially due to the resource constraints of smartphones
(especially limited battery power). Thus, existing malware
defenses for desktop computers cannot be applied directly
on the smartphone platform. Much of the existing research
focuses on optimizing desktop based defenses for mobile
phones [39], [36], [38], [13], [8]. These approaches either
try to speed-up the detection process using advanced data
structures and algorithms, or use the network or remote
server to reduce computation overhead on individual de-
vices.
In practice, to protect mobile phones from malware at-
tacks, major mobile phone manufacturers, such as Google,
Apple, and Nokia, employ permission models to prevent
malware from being installed at the first place. However,
this approach relies upon user diligence and awareness,
while most computer users lack these traits in practice. In-
stead of relying on user permissions, smartphone manufac-
turers also rely upon application review before releasing to
people for download. However, application review process
can be cumbersome and prone to human error [8].
1.1 Motivation and Rationale
We argue that existing malware defenses, without consider-
ing the special characteristics of smartphone malware and
that of smartphones themselves, might not be sufficient
to detect sophisticated malware, such as the pickpocket
malware targeting NFC mentioned previously.1 First, the
pickpocket malware [5], under the cover of tic-tac-toe,
is quite stealthy. Its surreptitious scanning may not cause
substantial changes (such as sharp increase in the number of
emails sent or in power consumption) to the normal behav-
ioral profile and therefore behavioral detection schemes will
not be effective. Moreover, most existing malware detection
schemes employ a posteriori approach. That is, malicious
attacks are detected after they take place as traces need
to be collected and trained before they can be compared
with profiles to find abnormalities. Because of the sensitive
(financial) nature of the NFC service, it is quite risky
to adopt such a posteriori detection approach. Instead, it
is important to develop a preventive approach which can
constantly monitor, identify, and then stop such potentially
malicious activity before it is launched so as to minimize
damage or loss.
This motivates us to design a novel approach for malware
prevention through contextual awareness. Our rationale is
as follows. Smartphones are personal devices. That is, the
end user is a human being. Thus, (legitimate) access to
sensitive/valuable services such as premium calls, SMS or
NFC usually involves different types of human activities
such as dialing a phone number, typing a message, or
1. Throughout the paper, we will center our malware mitigation design
based on properties observed from the pickpocket malware [5]; however,
our approaches, being fundamental in nature, will be applicable to a broad
range of future malware.
clicking an application icon on the screen (to execute the
application). In contrast, one common pattern followed
by malware found on mobile phones is that it attempts
to access sensitive services without the user’s awareness
and authorization (thus user activity is very unlikely to be
involved). Therefore, one way to detect such unauthorized,
thus potentially malicious behavior, is to validate whether
an action is initiated by pure software or purposefully by
a human user.
Since legitimate access to sensitive services usually
involves different types of hand movements, we explore
the use of gestures to differentiate between pure software
and human-initiated activities. In particular, in this paper,
we propose Tap-Wave-Rub (TWR), a lightweight malware
detection mechanism for smartphones based on intuitive
human gesture recognition, using sensors already available
on current smartphones with little or no additional user
involvement.
The proposed gesture-based detection mechanism serves
as an extension to the currently adopted permission model
used by major smartphone OSs. That is, whenever a sen-
sitive service is requested, a particular gesture needs to be
detected (to make sure it is a human generated activity)
before the request can be granted. Otherwise, the activity
is very likely generated by malware. As gesture detection
is enforced every time a sensitive request is received, the
proposed mechanism provides continuous monitoring of
sensitive resources and services from unauthorized access
attempts by malware. We note, the latest Android Jelly
Bean 4.2 has an added security feature, Premium SMS Con-
firmation, that includes a giant list of premium shortcodes
for each country and alerts a user anytime an app tries to
send a message to a shortcode [3]. Our TWR permission
model follows a similar approach but the security decision
is based on presence or absence of gestures.
1.2 Our Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows.
1) We propose TWR, a novel approach for malware
prevention with an exclusive focus on the smartphone
platform based on intuitive gesture recognition. As
part of this system, we propose two novel light-
weight gesture recognition schemes that can be used
in different contexts with little to no additional user
involvement. The first mechanism, phone tapping
detection based on accelerometer data, is geared for
NFC applications, which usually require the user to
tap her phone with another device. The second mech-
anism, hand waving and finger tapping / rubbing de-
tection based on proximity sensor data, involves very
simple gestures from the user, i.e., tapping or rubbing
a finger near the top of phone’s screen or waving a
hand close to the phone, and broadly appeal to many
applications (e.g., SMS). These gestures are as easy
for users to perform as many commonly deployed
gestures, such as the iPhone’s finger swiping gesture.
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2) We outline how Tap-Wave-Rub can reside within the
kernel-level middle layer between sensitive services
and applications trying to access the services, and
be integrated specifically with the existing Android
permission model. This TWR-enhanced permission
model provides continuous enforcement of access
control to sensitive resources and services even after
an application is installed on the platform.
3) We report on the implementation of our prototypes
for the TWR gesture recognition schemes on the
Android platform.
4) To evaluate our approach, we conduct experiments
to simulate the behavior of malware and normal user
usage activity. Our experiment results show that the
proposed mechanism can successfully detect mali-
cious attempts to access sensitive services with high
detection rates, while imposing minimal usability
burden.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 overviews related research. Section 3 presents the
threat model and design goals, and overviews our system.
Section 4 introduces the TWR enhanced permission model.
Section 5 presents two light-weight human gesture recogni-
tion schemes. Section 6 shows the promising feasibility of
our work through novel experiments. Section 7 discusses
various features of our system and Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Malware Detection and Prevention
Malware has threatened PCs for many years and a large
number of malware defenses has accumulated in the lit-
erature. Generally speaking, the two most commonly used
approaches for malware detection and analysis are static
analysis [14], [39], [37] and dynamic analysis [18], [40],
[7], [41]. Static analysis, also known as signature-based
detection, is based on source or binary code inspection to
find suspicious patterns (malware) inside the code. This
approach has been used by many antivirus companies.
However, it can be evaded by malware authors through
simple obfuscation, polymorphism and packing techniques.
Also it cannot detect zero day attacks. Dynamic analysis,
also known as behavior-based detection, monitors and
compares the running behavior of an application (e.g.,
system calls, file accesses, API calls) against malicious
and/or normal behavior profiles through the use of machine
learning techniques. It is more resilient to polymorphic
worms and code obfuscation and has the potential to defeat
zero-day worms.
Whether static or dynamic, current malware detection
techniques for desktop computers are still considered too
time consuming for resource-constrained mobile devices
operated on battery. Most existing research focus on op-
timizing desktop solutions to fit on mobile devices. The
work of [39] tries to speed-up the signature lookup process
in static analysis by using hashes. Several collaborative
analysis techniques have been proposed to distribute the
work of analysis by a network of devices [36], [38]. Remote
server assisted analysis techniques have also been proposed
to reduce the overhead of computation on individual devices
[13], [8].
Nevertheless, implementation of malware detection tech-
niques on mobile phones is still an emerging area of
research and a challenging job [8]. In practice, to protect
mobile phones from malware attacks, major mobile phone
companies, such as Google, Apple, and Nokia, use applica-
tion review and permission model to prevent malware from
being installed at the first place.
In the permission model, a user is asked to check
permission requests of an application before installing it.
The user either needs to grant all the permissions or choose
not to proceed with the installation. So, it is the user’s
sole responsibility to decide whether the set of permissions
granted to the application is potentially harmful or not. It
requires users be well-educated to identify suspicious per-
mission requests. This practice of granting permissions all-
at-once and only at installation time provides only coarse-
grained access control to sensitive resources / services as
subsequent permission check by the OS is transparent to
the user. This leaves doors to malware writers as they can
always expect users who are simply ignorant. Indeed, the
widespread presence of mobile phone malware suggests
that users actually do not care about giving permission to
software they download. So the user is not aware how and
when the permissions are exercised after the installation.
Also permission model can be circumvented through per-
mission escalation attacks [17], [23]. Moreover, application
developers do not always follow the least privilege rule with
their permission requests. In a recent study, the authors
pointed out one-third of application investigated are over
privileged [23]. So far, Android has the most extensive
permission system and it is considered more vulnerable to
potential malware attacks.
The application review model adapts another approach.
Instead of relying on user permission, smartphone compa-
nies review applications themselves before releasing them
to people for download. There are two types of application
reviews: manual and automatic. Apple reviews all applica-
tions in the App Store while Symbian automatically tests
Symbian signed applications. The manual process can be
cumbersome and prone to human error while the automatic
review is not considered to be an effective deterrent [8].
The most closely related work to ours is the one proposed
in [12]. It shares similar philosophy as ours. It utilizes
whether there are hardware interruptions to differentiate
pure software initiated action and human initiated action
[12]. It aims at detecting malware specifically targeting
SMS and audio services. These services usually start with
user’s pressing or touching the keypad or touchscreen which
generate hardware interruptions for each key/screen press
event. A purely software generated activity (or malware
generated activity), on the other hand, will not explicitly
generate a hardware interrupt. Although this approach is
believed to be effective for malware detection, it cannot
help detect a more sophisticated malware such as the pick-
pocket malware. This is because the pickpocket malware
CRYPTOLOGY EPRINT ARCHIVE 4
gets activated by user’s playing the tic-tac-toe game, which
already involves touch screen activity that can generate
hardware interrupts. The difference between [12] and our
work can be summarized as follows. [12] attempts to check
whether there is (any) user activity whereas our goal is to
check whether there is a special user-aware activity. So
our approach provides more fine-grained access control to
sensitive services and thus can detect even sophisticated
malware.
Another work that parallels to ours was recently pre-
sented in [34]. It proposes an approach of user-driven access
control by granting permission to the application when
user’s permission granting intent is captured. It introduces
access control gadgets (ACGs) which are UI elements ex-
posed by each user-owned resource for applications to em-
bed. The user’s authentic UI interaction with corresponding
ACG grant the permission to an application to access the
corresponding resource. A fundamental difference between
[34] and our work is that the design proposed by [34] grants
the permission to an application when user’s authentic UI
interaction with corresponding ACG is captured whereas
our design grants permission to an application when a spe-
cific user gesture (tapping/waving) is captured. The design
proposed by [34] not only requires kernel level changes
but also necessitates application level modifications. It
also requires Resource Monitor (RM) to be incorporated
for each resource such as the device drivers. Moreover,
it requires additional composition ACG (C-ACG) along
with composition RM if an application requires different
resources to be accessed/used. Our work, in contrast to [34],
has an advantage in that it neither requires application level
changes nor requires resource monitor to be added for each
resource. Note that if there are many resources that can be
used by an application, then the number of C-ACG and
C-RM will become extremely large. Another advantage of
our work over [34] is that our design supports “services”
(such as NFC) which do not have any specific UI elements
or ACGs associated with them. For the approach of [34]
to work with services like NFC, additional ACG for UI
interaction will need to be added, which will significantly
hamper the usability of such services. In contrast, in our
case, implicit permission granting intent is acquired by
capturing the tapping gesture.
2.2 Human Activity Detection and Security
Gesture recognition has been extensively studied to support
spontaneous interactions with consumer electronics and
mobile devices in the context of pervasive computing [6],
[11], [29]. Due to the uniqueness of gestures to different
users, personalized gestures have been used for various
security purposes.
Gesture recognition has been used for user authentication
to address the problem of illegal use of stolen devices
[24], [15]. In [24], a mobile device gets unlocked to use
when it detects the gait (walking pattern) of the legitimate
owner. In [15], a smartphone gets locked when it does
not detect the “picking-up phone” gesture which the owner
naturally performs to answer a phone. Both works provide
transparent user authentication and do not require explicit
user involvement. [30] reports a series of user studies that
evaluate the feasibility and usability of light-weight user
authentication based on gesture recognition using a single
tri-axis accelerometer.
Gesture recognition is also used to defend against unau-
thorized reading and Ghost-and-Leech relay attacks in
RFID systems [16], [26]. The secret handshake scheme
proposed in [16] allows an RFID tag to respond to reader
query selectively when the tag owner moves the tag in a
certain pattern (i.e., secret handshake). The work of [26]
uses posture as a valid context to unlock a tag in some
RFID applications without changing the underlying user
usage model.
The use of unique key press gestures or secure attention
sequences (SASs), such as CTRL-ALT-DEL, may also
serve as a means to defend against malware. However,
we are not aware of SASs being currently used on mobile
phones. SASs need to be unique and usually require mul-
tiple key presses simultaneously (e.g., CTRL-ALT-DEL).
Such sequences will be very hard for the user to perform
on phones. Some of the gestures proposed in our paper (i.e.,
hand waving, finger tapping or rubbing) can be viewed as
a form of novel and user-friendly SAS suitable for phones.
To distinguish a malware activy from a human user activity,
[25] rely upon detecting keyboard or mouse activity and a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). However, this approach
is limited to devices equipped with a TPM, and thus is
not suitable for most (if not all) current mobile phones and
smartphones.
3 BACKGROUND AND MODELS
3.1 Threat Model
In our model, we assume that the mobile phone is already
infected with malware. As in the pickpocketing attack of
[5], the malware could reside within a benign looking appli-
cation (e.g., a game) which the user may have downloaded
from an untrusted source. Our model covers a broad range
of malware and does not impose any restriction on malware
behavior except that an action from the malware is not
human-triggered. For example, the malware may want to
access a service or resource (such as NFC, SMS or GPS)
available on the phone itself, or to communicate with an
external entity, such as an attacker-controlled remote server
(botmaster).
We assume that the OS kernel is healthy and immune to
malware infection. In particular, the malware is not able to
maliciously alter the kernel control flow. Also, the phone
hardware is assumed to be malware-free. Specifically, we
assume that the malware can not manipulate the input to,
and output from, the phone’s on-board sensors.
We do not impose any restriction as to how frequently
the malware attempts to access a given service. However,
in order to remain stealthy, constantly attempting access
would not be feasible for the malware, and rather random
or periodic sampling is expected.
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In addition to the user space level control of the phone,
the malware may collude and synchronize with an entity
in close physical proximity of the phone (and its user).
This external entity may attempt to manipulate the physical
environment in which the phone is present or interfere with
the user per se. We do not, however, allow this attacker to
have physical access to the phone. That is, if the attacker
has physical access to the phone, then he can lock/unlock
a resource just like the phone’s user. In other words, our
mechanisms are not meant for user authentication and do
not provide protection in the face of loss or theft of phone.
3.2 Design Goals
For our malware prevention approach to be useful in
practice, it must satisfy the following properties:
• Lightweight-ness: The approach should be lightweight
in terms of the various required resources available on
the phone, such as memory, computation and battery
power.
• Efficiency: The approach should incur little delay.
Otherwise, it can affect the overall usability of the
system. We believe that no more than a few seconds
should be spent executing the approach.
• Robustness: The approach should be tolerant to er-
rors. Both the False Negative Rate (FNR) and False
Positive Rate (FPR) should be quite low. A low FNR
means that a user would, with high probability, be
able to execute an application (which accesses some
sensitive services) without being rejected. Low FNR
also implies a better usability. On the other hand, Low
FPR means that there should be little probability to
grant access to a sensitive service when a user does
not intend to do so. Low FPR clearly implies a little
chance for malware to evade detection.
• Usage Model Consistency: The solution should re-
quire little, or no change, to the usage model of
existing smartphone applications. Ideally, if the use of
a particular phone service can be commonly associated
with a particular (unique) gesture (e.g., phone tapping
for NFC), this gesture may be used to specially protect
the said service. In this case, no changes to the adopted
usage model will be necessary. It is also possible
that there is no unique gesture pattern that can be
found to use a certain service (e.g., Bluetooth). In
such a situation, an intuitive gesture template can be
associated with that service and a user will be required
to explicitly perform the hand movements defined by
that gesture. In this case, only minor changes to the
adopted usage model will be imposed.
3.3 Why Tap-Wave-Rub?
At a higher level, to distinguish between malware and
human-initiated activity, we envision two different cat-
egories of methods: implicit and explicit. The implicit
approaches automatically infer whether or not a human
activity is taking place based on contextual information.
The explicit approach, on the other hand, determines the
presence of human user by means of explicit human in-
volvement.
A number of context-aware malware detection mecha-
nisms are possible. The implicit category of mechanisms
could be applied in scenarios whereby the access to a
resource is pre-empted by a specific human gesture. It
would certainly be quick and user-friendly since no ad-
ditional work is needed by the user. The use of keypad or
touchscreen activity, as previously studied in [12], might
be a good fit in some scenarios, such as when accessing
SMS and audio services. These services usually start with
user’s pressing or touching the keypad or touchscreen which
generate hardware interruptions for each key/screen press
event. A purely software generated activity (or malware
generated activity), on the other hand, will not explicitly
generate a hardware interrupt. Although this approach
might be effective to prevent malwares targeting SMS and
audio services, it can not help prevent the activation of a
more sophisticated malware such as the NFC pickpocket
malware [5]. It is because this malware gets activated by
user’s playing the tic-tac-toe game, which already involves
touch screen activity that can generate hardware interrupts.
In other words, the use of keypad or touchscreen activity,
as a context for malware detection, is expected to result in
high false unlocking likelihood, and thus poor security.
Fortunately, in the context of NFC, there already exists a
natural gesture, “phone tapping” using which NFC services
are accessed. Tapping involves touching the phone against
an RFID tag, or another NFC device, and is a gesture users
commonly need to perform to use the NFC functional-
ity. In this paper, we develop a phone tapping detection
mechanism based on accelerometer data. As we would
demonstrate in the subsequent sections, this mechanism
satisfies all of our design goals, being lightweight, efficient,
robust and user-friendly.
Unlike NFC, most other services/resources on the phone
may not be associated with a unique implicit gesture. In
such situations, an explicit human involvement would be
necessary. At first glance, Biometrics as well as human-
interactive proofs, e.g., CAPTCHAs, appear to be natural
candidates for such an explicit detection. Both will prove
that a human is the one initiating an access request.
Biometrics, in addition, also prove that this human is the
owner of the phone, and thus provide protection in the event
of loss/theft of device (this level of protection is beyond our
threat model though). A variety of biometrics (such as face
or voice recognition) are already available on commodity
phones. Similarly, CAPTCHAs (such as textual/aural/visual
ones) are ubiquitous on the Internet and can be easily
adopted on the phones. However, both of these mechanisms
do not satisfy many of our design goals. Biometrics are not
lightweight, can be time consuming, have been known to be
error prone, and not very user-friendly (and rather invasive).
CAPTCHAs, on the other hand, are reasonably lightweight
(especially those based on text), but long known to be a
source of user frustration on the Internet, perhaps more so
on the phones due to their small form factors complicating
both display of the challenge and entry of the response.
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Since CAPTCHAs and biometrics do not seem to be sat-
isfactory means of explicit malware detection, we turn our
attention to lightweight and natural gestures. In particular,
we explore hand waving, finger tapping or rubbing, all of
which could be identified by proximity sensors available
on most modern phones. A wave involves waving a hand
in close proximity of the phone. A tap/rub involves tapping
or rubbing a finger near the top of phone’s screen, which
is where the proximity sensor is usually located. All these
gestures cause a sudden fluctuation in the readings of the
proximity sensor, and can be very easily identified, and are
robust to errors, as we will demonstrate in the following
sections. It is important to note that the proximity sensor
is located off of the touch screen or display, and therefore
regular touchscreen inputs are not likely to trigger a tap
or rub. Wave is also a unique gesture quite unlikely to be
exhibited in daily activities of users.
4 TWR-ENHANCED PERMISSION MODEL
Permission models have become very common on smart-
phone operating systems to provide access control to sen-
sitive services for installed third party application. The
Android platform has the most extensive permission system
and poses to become a market leader. Thus, we base the
design of our TWR system on the Android platform.
The idea of the TWR system is to add another layer of
permission check before the original Android permission
check. As stated in Section 3.1, we assume the adversary
is not able to maliciously alter the kernel control flow. So
gesture detection forms a trusted path with the OS.
Intercepted permission requests are handled by the five
components in the TWR’s architecture: TWR Permis-
sionChecker, TWR GestureManager, TWR GestureExtrac-
tor, TWR TemplateCreator, and TWR GestureDatabase.
The architecture of TWR is depicted in Figure 1. In the
following paragraphs, we present the role of each TWR
component by describing the possible interaction between
them and the outside world.
The TWR PermissionChecker stands in front of the
original Android Permission check. When an application
initiates a request to access a sensitive service, the request
is intercepted by TWR PermissionChecker. This component
interacts with TWR GestureManager to check whether the
requested service is protected by a certain gesture. If not,
the request is forwarded to the Android Permission Check
as usual. Otherwise, TWR GestureManager interacts with
the TWR GestureExtractor to begin collecting gesture data
(tapping, rubbing, or waving in this paper). The captured
data is then sent to the TWR GestureManager for further
process.
Here we distinguish between two types of gesture
recognition: user-dependent and user-independent. As their
names suggest, a gesture is user-dependent if there is
significant variation among gesture data from multiple
participants for the same predefined gesture; while a gesture
is user-independent if either there is no apparent difference
or the recognition process does not differentiate among
TWR 
PermissionChecker
Android 
Permission Check
Application
TWR 
GestureManager
TWR
GestureExtractor
TWR
TemplateCreator
TWR
GestureDatabase
User
TWR System
Android Middleware
Kernel
Applications
Fig. 1. The TWR Architecture
user data from multiple participants. Our phone tap gesture
recognition is user-dependent as it captures the user’s own
features of the tapping movement. Given that users can
hold a phone in different ways and use different forces
to tap, the phone tap gesture is thus user-dependent. Our
hand wave or finger tap/rubbing recognition scheme is user-
independent as it infers user activity by checking whether
a special location (in our context, the place where the
proximity sensor is located) is touched or not (instead of
the potentially biometric feature of human movement).
For user-dependent gesture recognition, we usually need
to create a gesture template which is used as a reference in
the actual recognition stage. The user can interact with the
TWR TemplateCreator to register a new gesture template, to
update and delete exiting gesture templates. TWR Template-
Creator is an Android application which allows interaction
between TWR and the user. When the user creates, deletes,
or modifies the gesture information, it needs to retrieve
and store the information to TWR GestureDatabase via
TWR GestureManager. TWR GestureManager is the only
component that has access to TWR GestureDatabase.
So depending on the type of gesture recognition scheme
(user-dependent or user-independent), the TWR Gesture-
Manager processes the gesture data from TWR Gesture-
Extractor differently. If the gesture is user-dependent, it
compares the similarity between the newly captured data
with the corresponding gesture template stored in the
TWR GestureDatabase. If the gesture is user-independent,
the TWR GestureManager determines directly whether a
gesture is performed or not by utilizing information in the
captured data without the help of a template. In either case,
if a required gesture is detected, the request is forwarded
to Android Permission Check for further check. Otherwise,
the request for service access is rejected.
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5 TAP-WAVE-RUB GESTURE DETECTION
5.1 Phone Tap Detection
As we mentioned in Section 2, the use of hardware interrup-
tion to differentiate between pure software initiated activity
and human initiated activity is not effective to prevent
malware hidden under the cover of a victim app, since
activating the victim app already involves keypad click or
screen touch which can generate hardware interrupts. This
motivates us to use app-specific user events to distinguish
between hidden malware and an app initiated by a human
being. That is, instead of simply using general key/screen
press events to infer human activity, we try to recognize
whether it involves the right activity a user needs to do to
access a sensitive service, such as the access to NFC.
A smartphone is a personal hand-held device installed
with a lot of apps. Most of the time, these apps are activated
by specific phone/hand movements. For example, when a
user wants to place a call, she needs to unlock the screen,
activates the phone app, inputs the number (or clicks on
a name in the contact list), and then puts the phone near
the ear to start the call. Also, to use the NFC to scan a
smart poster, a user needs to unlock the screen, activates
the NFC reader app, and taps the phone on the smart poster
to read information. Since “tapping” (touching the phone
against an RFID tag, or another NFC device) is a gesture
which users commonly need to perform to use the NFC
functionality, as an illustrative example, we can use tapping
to determine whether an NFC access is human-initiated
or not. Intuitively, tapping on a smart-poster should be
different from other user phone activities (such as keyboard
click or screen touch) and user physical activities (such as
walking or running).
One advantage of this tapping approach is that it does not
require any additional user activity besides what is being
used commonly, and thus transparently recognizes user ac-
tivity when a user taps a smart poster to obtain information.
However, it may exhibit false positive rates and not fully
prevent the pickpocket malware activation since normal
user activities (such as playing the game) may generate
motions similar to tapping. To achieve higher prevention
rate, we can try other intuitive user-aware gestures similar
to tapping, such as “tapping twice” or “tapping thrice” in
succession.
To recognize tapping, we utilize the on-board accelerom-
eter data. An accelerometer sensor measures the forces
applied to the phone (minus the force of gravity) on the
three axes: x, y, and z. Let (ax, ay, az) denote the values
corresponding to the 3 axes from the accelerometer.
Our detection algorithm consists of two phases: training
phase and recognition phase. In the training phase, a user
performs the target action (tapping) multiple times, and
accelerometer data of the action is recorded and processed
to generate a tapping template. The template serves as a
reference to be compared later with real-time user move-
ment data: a match indicates the recognition of user tapping
activity; otherwise, it is inferred that either there is no user
activity or the activity is not the “valid” user activity to
grant NFC access.
After the training phase, the system compares a newly
observed movement with the template. The system records
the accelerometer data, from the moment the user activates
the NFC reader app, until she taps on a smart poster.
To recognize tapping, the system computes the cross-
correlation C of the acceleration data A against the template
T , both of size n data points as shown in Equation 1.
The cross-correlation C computed from Equation 1 when
comparing two time series is a real value, representing
a similarity measure. The higher the value of C, the
higher the similarity between the two series. The maximum
value is obtained when the two series under comparison
are identical. A movement is considered a valid tapping
activity when the computed cross-correlation C exceeds a
certain cross-correlation threshold which is usually obtained
through empirical study.
C(A, T ) =
∑n
i=1(axi − a¯x)(Txi − T¯x)√∑n
i=1(axi − a¯x)2
√∑n
i=1(Txi − T¯x)2
=
∑n
i=1(ayi − a¯y)(Tyi − T¯y)√∑n
i=1(ayi − a¯y)2
√∑n
i=1(Tyi − T¯y)2
=
∑n
i=1(azi − a¯z)(Tzi − T¯z)√∑n
i=1(azi − a¯z)2
√∑n
i=1(Tzi − T¯z)2
(1)
where a¯x denotes the means of time series axi for i ∈ [1, n]
(others follow the same notation).
Here we describe one way to determine the cross-
correlation threshold. Suppose we have m traces of tapping
movements T1, ..., Tm. The threshold CT can be estimated
as the minimum cross-correlation between any two series
Ti and Tj (i, j ∈ [1,m] and i 6= j). That is:
CT = min
m
i,j=1(C(Ti, Tj)) (2)
5.2 Hand Wave, Finger Tap or Rub Detection
The goal of a proximity sensor is to detect the presence of a
nearby object, not necessarily in physical contact with the
sensor. This sensor works by sending an electromagnetic
signal and analyzing the change in the electromagnetic
field or the returned signal itself. Usually, the range of
a proximity sensor is very small (few cms at most), and
different forms of proximity sensors have been invented
[1]. Such sensors have seen an ubiquitous deployment on
current mobile phones. For mobile phone manufacturers,
the primary use of a proximity sensor is to help preserve
battery power. This is achieved by turning off the phone’s
display especially in cases when the user is on a phone
call where user’s ear is close to the proximity sensor. This
is the reason the proximity sensor is located near the ear
piece of a mobile phone, off of its display (see Figure 2).
This is true for most, if not all, smartphones, including the
Androids and iPhones. We note that this is a property that
we carefully leverage in developing our tapping or rubbing
gesture mechanisms for malware defense. Such gestures
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do not interfere with the gestures made by the user while
interacting with the phones’ (touch screen) display, and
significantly reduce the False Positive Rate (FPR).
In order to utilize the proximity sensor for our purpose,
we needed a human gesture that can “trigger” the sensor in
some way and not likely to be exhibited in daily activities.
To this end, we resort to gestures that can fluctuate the
readings of the sensor quickly for a short duration of time.
This could be easily achieved by the user bringing in,
and moving out, her hand/finger in close proximity of the
sensor. This inspired us to develop three gestures: hand
waving (waving one’s hand close to the phone), finger
tapping (tapping a finger near the sensor, i.e., close to the
top of the screen) and rubbing (rubbing a finger near the
sensor).
The algorithm to detect quick fluctuations in the reading
of the proximity sensor is very simple and straightforward
(which makes it lightweight, satisfying one of our design
goals). Basically, when there is a proximity change, the
time is recorded and the difference in time reading with
an n-th previous reading (we use n = 6) is compared. If
the difference is less than a pre-specified time limit (the
upper bound of the duration of the gesture; in our case
1.5 seconds), the device will be unlocked. Otherwise, it
will remain locked. A detailed pseudocode for this simple
procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Tap-Wave-Rub Detection using Proximity
Sensor Data
1: Set proxIndex = 0, WIND SZ = 6,
WAV E TIME LIMIT = 1500 ms, and
UNLOCK TIME FRAME = 1000 ms
2: Record the time whenever proximity sensor detects a change
1) An array ProxChangeT ime with size equal to
WIND SZ was used to record the time of proximity
sensor change in cyclic order.
3: Calculate the time difference between the current time with
the time recorded in previous six sensor change value.
1) T imeDiff = ProxChangeT ime[proxIndex] −
ProxChangeT ime[(proxIndex+1)%WIND SZ]
4: If TimeDiff is less than WAV E TIME LIMIT , Unlock
for UNLOCK TIME FRAME
5: Increase ProxIndex by 1, i.e., proxIndex =
(proxIndex+ 1)%WIND SZ
6: Repeat Step 2.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
6.1 Prototypes and Test Devices
To evaluate the feasibility of the TWR gesture detection
mechanisms, we first developed prototype applications on
the Android platform. The phone tapping detection scheme
was implemented and installed on a Google Nexus S An-
droid phone, while the hand waving, finger tapping/rubbing
detection scheme was implemented and installed on both
a Droid X2 phone and a Samsung Galaxy Nexus (I9250)
phone. The two Nexus phones come equipped with NFC
chips, and are therefore a good target devices for an
eventual deployment of our approach.
6.2 Phone Tap Experiment
In this section, we report on evaluation of tapping based
user activity recognition scheme outlined in Section 5.1.
This scheme is specially designed to protect against mal-
ware targeting NFC reading services, since tapping is a
natural hand movement which a user needs to perform to
use the reader function of NFC.
Since “tapping” (touching the phone against an RFID tag,
or another NFC device) is a very simple hand movement,
we hypothesize it might be confused with other user move-
ments such as those users perform when they play games,
and thus have higher false positive rate, FPR (or lower
prevention rate). In a hope to achieve higher prevention
rate, we also experiment with two other intuitive user-
aware gestures similar to tapping: tapping twice and tapping
thrice in succession. We call these three tapping gestures
as “tapping once”, “tapping twice”, and “tapping thrice”,
respectively.
First, to determine the cross-correlation detection thresh-
old, we collected 30 traces of accelerometer data for each
tapping gesture. Each of our trace contains 100 data points
and is recorded over a 2-second time period (we wanted
our schemes to be efficient). Each trace is then used as a
template, which is compared with all the other 29 traces
to calculate a serial of C values. The smallest C value
is chosen as the threshold value. This threshold value is
then stored with the corresponding tapping template and a
matched posture needs to yield a C value larger than this
threshold. These traces were collected by the experimenter
while performing NFC tapping gesture 30 times. Such data
collection and testing methodology is in-line with related
prior security work, e.g., Secret Handshakes [16]. Our
methodology captures a realistic usage scenario whereby
each user can be trained “once by their phone” and can
create their template, e.g., when they purchase the phone.
We first test the performance of the three tapping gestures
to identify which one can have higher recognition rate (thus
lower false negative rate, FNR). To do this, we collect
a total of 150 traces for each tapping gesture, 30 traces
every day for 5 days. We then use the template and the
threshold calculated above to determine the recognition
rate. The successful recognition rate is listed, in the form
of a confusion matrix, in Table 1. It shows that “tapping
once” achieves high recognition rate 94.67% (or a low FNR
5.33%) compared to the other two tapping gestures.
We next test the performance of the three tapping ges-
tures to identify which one is the least to be confused with
other user or phone movements and thus has low FPR. It
is important to evaluate the FPR. If a tapping gesture can
be very similar to a certain other movement (accidental or
manipulated by an attacker), the malware may circumvent
the gesture detection process.
To determine the FPR, we compare tapping postures with
many phone/user movements. These movements might be
just normal user activities, or activities coerced by a nearby
attacker. They include user movements such as: walking,
walking stairs, screen-touch activities (text messaging and
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Fig. 2. The locations of proximity sensor on a sample of smartphones (Galaxy Nexus, Droid X2, Galaxy S II)
TABLE 1
Phone Tapping Detection Results (rates at which a gesture shown on each row matches with gesture/activity
shown on each column
Tapping Tapping Tapping Walking Walking Still Screen-touch Phone
Once Twice Thrice Stairs Activities Movement
Tapping Once 94.67% NA NA 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Tapping Twice NA 92.67% NA 0% 1.33% 0% 0% 0%
Tapping Thrice NA NA 96.67% 0% 5.33% 0% 0% 0%
surfing Internet), phone-moving activity (motion gaming
and picking up calls), as well as, the scenarios where phone
is left still. For each movement, we also collect a total of
150 traces, 30 traces every day for 5 days. The error rates
are all listed in Table 1.
Our experiment result shows “tapping once” is very un-
likely to be confused with walking, walking stairs, still, and
screen-touch activities such as text messaging or Internet
browsing. However, it might occasionally be confused with
phone motion caused when the user plays game or picks
up a phone call with a false positive rate of 2%. “tapping
twice” and “tapping thrice”, on the other hand, are very
resilient to phone motions but they resemble motions when
a user walks on stairs. Nevertheless, all achieve satisfying
low false positive rate.
One potential reason why the false positive rate is low
might be that tapping is a type of user-aware movement.
When performing such a gesture, the user is believed to be
aware of her hand movement. So gestures are performed in
a more-or-less controlled way, e.g., the phone is always held
in the similar way when a user performs tapping. In non-
user-aware movements, on the other hand, the phone can
be tilted in any position. The reference template is usually
collected in a reference coordinate system. However, once
the phone is tilted, movement data collected from the device
is no longer in the reference coordinate system and the
corresponding movement will not be detected correctly.
In this way, user-aware gesture is very unlikely to be
similar with user-unaware movements, and thus has low
false positive rate. Previous studies on gesture recognition
also suggest certain gestures can be quite unique and
different from other gestures [16], [29]. So tapping can
be distinguished from other user-aware movements such
as “picking up the call”.
Our experiment result, contrary to our hypothesis that
“tapping once” may have high false positive rate, shows
that “tapping once” actually achieves both high recognition
rate and low false positive rate, and has a performance com-
parable to “tapping twice” and “tapping thrice”. However,
“tapping once” outperforms the other two tapping gestures
in term of efficiency, and has superior usability since it does
not require any change in the user usage model of NFC.
6.3 Hand Wave, Finger Tap and Rub Experiment
We conducted several experiments to evaluate our prototype
implementing the wave-tap-rub detection mechanism for
malware detection. As in the case of the phone tapping
experiments, the goal of our tests was to primarily estimate
the error rates, i.e., FNR and FPR.
In order to determine FNR, one of the authors of this
submission attempted to unlock the phone using the hand
waving as well as rubbing gesture. 50 trials using each
gesture were performed spanning over a period of 2 days.
Out of these, only on 1 occasion, this user failed to
unlock the phone, resulting in an average recognition rate
of 98% (or FNR of 2%). Since multiple trials may have
trained this user significantly likely leading to a bias, we
further conducted our tests with multiple other users. These
volunteers were drawn from our Department (CS) and were
mostly students at undergraduate and graduate levels. The
users were first explained the purpose of the study and then
demonstrated the gestures using which they were to unlock
the phone. The users were specified the location of the
proximity sensor on the phone. Although in real life, users
may not be aware of the location of the proximity sensor,
they can be easily provided with this information using a
simple interface. For example, an arrow pointer could be
provided on the screen which points to the proximity sensor,
and user could be asked to wave/tap/rub accordingly.
A total of 16 volunteers participated in our study. 8 of
the participants were requested to perform the waving based
unlocking 10 times and the results were recorded automat-
ically by our program. The resulting average recognition
rate observed was 93.75% (or FNR of 6.25% [5/80]).
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TABLE 2
Hand Waving, and Finger Tapping / Rubbing Detection Results (rates at which a gesture shown on each row
matches with gesture/activity shown on each column)
Hand Tapping / Walking Phone Drop/ Daily Screen-touch Game Game Bumping
Waving Rubbing Fall Activity Activities Play (O1) Play (O2)
Hand Waving 93.75% NA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tapping / Rubbing NA 96.25% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 6.5% 0%
The other 8 users were asked to evaluate the rub gesture
or finger tapping based unlocking. The users were not
restricted to using one or the other gesture, and it was up
to their discretion as to which one they wanted to use. The
observed average recognition rate in this case was 96.25%
(or FNR of 3.75% [3/80]).
These error rates can be deemed to be fairly low, and we
expect them to further reduce significantly as users become
more and more familiar with such gestures.
Next, we set out to evaluate the likelihood of false
unlocking under different activities. These activities might
be just daily user activities, or activities coerced by a
nearby attacker. To this end, the experimenter conducted
several tests emulating different user activities that have the
potential of triggering the proximity sensor fluctuations. In
each test, the phone was set to record a trigger event and
its frequency. Each of the test was performed with each of
our test devices (Droid and Nexus).
First, to simulate a walking activity, the mobile phone
was stowed in a backpack and the experimenter, carrying
the backpack on shoulders, walked around for 10 minutes.
No trigger events occurred in this case. The experiment
was repeated at a later point of time for a duration of
15 minutes. Still, the phone did not get unlock at all. We
further continued this experiment for a duration of 2 hours
during which the experimenter was walking and driving a
car. No unlocking events occurred even in this case also.
To trigger sudden fluctuations to the proximity sensor
readings, we next conducted a “drop and fall” test. This
mimicked a situation where the phone accidentally drops
on, or is thrown at, a surface. Clearly, we could not just
drop or throw our test device on the floor to avoid damaging
it. To do this meaningfully, therefore, we first threw our test
device on a bed, with the screen (and thus the proximity
sensor) facing the bed, from a height of 50cm to 70cm.
10 trials of this test were performed. Then, we similarly
dropped the device on a couch 15 times and a bed 15 times.
No triggering events were recorded over this set of tests.
Our next test involved treating the test device as the
experimenter’s own device. During this test, which last
for about 1 day, the experimenter made and received
phone calls, typed SMS messages, browsed the Internet,
walked around while the phone was kept in pocket, went
up/downstairs, drove, and left the phone on a table near a
keyboard while typing on the keyboard, among other chore
activities. No unlocking was registered.
In the above test, we had evaluated the effect of touch-
screen typing on the phone while writing SMSs and brows-
ing the Internet. Since the proximity sensor is located on
top of the screen, such touchscreen activities were naturally
not supposed to be affecting the sensor’s output. However,
more involved touchscreen activities, such as game play,
may have an impact and may mimic the rub gesture.
To test this hypothesis, the experimenter played a number
of games in the “landscape mode”, such as FIFA or Modern
Combat. This test was performed while the phone was held
in two orientations:
O1: thumb blocking the proximity sensor (Figure 3)
O2: thumb not blocking the proximity sensor (Figure 4)
The games were played for a duration of about 15
minutes on each of our test devices. Interestingly, the
phone did register a few unlocking events in the second
orientation. A total of 4 such events occurred out of a total
of 61 changes in sensor readings, resulting in an FPR of
6.5%. However, no unlockings were recorded in the first
orientation. This could be attributed to the fact that when
the thumb was blocking the sensor, it did not induce sudden
fluctuations to the reading. On the other hand, when the
thumb was below the sensor, while playing a game, the
gestures, such as firing a gun or moving an object, would
have triggered the sensor.
We also conducted tests to simulate a nearby adversary
who may (deliberately) bumps into a user, while the phone
is in the pocket, in order to trigger a false unlocking. We
did 10 trials of this test, and no unlocking was recorded,
leading to a FPR of 0%.
The results of all of our tests are summarized as a confu-
sion matrix depicted in Table 2. These indicate that the tap-
wave-rub gesture based on proximity sensing is quite robust
to accidental unlocking in practice. The only scenario where
the phone could accidentally get unlocked was during a
touchscreen game play activity when the phone was held
in a particular orientation. However, even this scenario
provides an important insight. Namely, a rubbing gesture is
likely to be exhibited while playing games in the landscape
mode under one of the orientations only, the one where
the thumb does not block the sensor. This implies that,
depending upon the location of the proximity sensor on
a phone, one of the orientations could be disabled by the
phone’s OS to prevent this accidental unlocking from taking
place.
7 DISCUSSION
Overall, our experiment results in previous section show
that both phone tapping recognition, and hand waving,
finger tapping or rubbing recognition can serve as two
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Fig. 3. Orientation 1 (O1): Thumb Blocking the Prox-
imity Sensor
Fig. 4. Orientation 2 (O2): Thumb Not Blocking the
Proximity Sensor
different means to infer the “right” human activity in order
to unlock the use of sensitive services on smartphones, thus
preventing unauthorized and stealthy access from malware.
Both result in quite low error rates, FNR as well as FPR,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach. We believe
that FNR can be further reduced as users become more and
more familiar with the underlying gestures.
In this section, we compare the performance of the two
gesture recognition schemes and discuss issues relevant to
gesture recognition for human activity inference in general.
7.1 Effect of Orientation
For phone tapping recognition, we use a single three-
axis accelerometer to infer the force due to tapping by
measuring accelerations on the three axes. When the phone
is held in the hand with different ways or under different
orientations, the accelerometer can be tilted around the
three axes. This means that the same external force may
produce different accelerations along the three axes of the
accelerometer. Hence, successful recognition rate (or FNR)
can be affected due to different phone orientations. How-
ever, as long as the phone is held in the similar way, thus the
same orientation, when a user performs tapping (which is
usually the case), the tilting effect can be minimized. We
emphasize that for all three tapping gestures, we achieve
similar high recognition rates (or low FNR) as other hand
gestures in previous study [16], [29]. On the other hand,
orientation or the tilt effect does help us achieve very low
FPR as we explained in Section 6.2.
Our experiment results show that phone’s orientation can
affect the FPR of our proximity sensor based scheme. This
is because in a certain orientation, it might be possible for
hand movements to accidentally trigger the proximity sen-
sor. As argued in Section 6.3, we suggest the OS can disable
such a “dangerous” orientation to prevent this accidental
unlocking from taking place. Luckily, due to the location
of the proximity sensor (near the ear piece), only one of
the orientations need to be disabled, while the other can
safely be permitted, without lowering the overall usability.
Another possibility to avoid such an accidental unlocking in
our scheme is to infer the orientation of the device based on
accelerometer data. If a dangerous orientation is detected,
the access can be disabled by default.
7.2 Implicit vs. Explicit Gestures
As outlined in Section 3.3, gesture recognition can be
implicit or explicit. In implicit gesture recognition, a user’s
natural movement to access a certain service is captured for
human activity inference. The good thing about implicit
gesture recognition is that it does not change the usage
model of existing smartphone applications and transpar-
ently enforces access control to sensitive services. The
phone tap gesture is an example of such an implicit gesture
required for accessing the NFC service. Not every service
can be associated with a particular gesture, however.
In explicit gesture recognition, a user is required to
perform a certain hand movement to unlock a service. The
hand wave or finger tap/rub gesture is an example of such
an explicit gesture. As long as gesture recognition is robust
(with low FPR and FNR) and lightweight, multiple services
can share the same explicit gesture. This is indeed the case
for our explicit gestures. Given that our phone tap gesture
performed quite well, it can also be used as an explicit
gesture to access a service besides NFC. In this case, the
user would simply need to tap her phone with her hand or
a nearby object to unlock a service.
7.3 User Characteristics
The phone tap gesture is user-dependent as it captures
the user’s own (perhaps unique) feature of the tapping
movement for recognition. A previous study shows that
there is significant variation among different participants
even for the same predefined gesture [29]. Indeed, user-
dependent gestures can be and has been used for user
authentication [24], [15]. As for phone tap, different users
may hold the phone in different ways and use different
forces to perform the gesture. This means that this ges-
ture may provide user authentication, and thus protection
against unauthorized access to services in case the phone
is lost/stolen. Validation of this hypothesis required further
investigation. However, when a phone is shared by multiple
users, say by different family members, each has to register
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his/her own tap template in order to use our approach.
This training is only one-time and will not undermine the
usability of our approach.
On the other hand, our hand wave, and finger tap/rubbing
gestures is quite user-independent as shown in our exper-
iment results. That means, the service can be shared by
multiple users without registering his/her own template. In
fact, there is no template employed in this scheme. This
scheme therefore may offer a higher level of convenience
to the users and easily adoptable. Of course, it does not
prevent unauthorized use of such service when the phone
is stolen.
7.4 Social Engineering Attacks
The low FPR in our experiments demonstrates the low
likelihood that an application will gain access to critical
resources without the knowledge of the user. This is based
on an assumption that a malware program can not emulate
the required gestures. However, it is possible for a compet-
ing malware writer to fool a user by launching a social-
engineering attack. For example, a malware developer can
design a game such that user has to move his phone
in certain ways mimicking the gesture of tapping, or a
game in which a frequently pressed button is placed very
close to the proximity sensor, which may trigger wave
or rubbing gesture. Also, malicious program can wait for
the legitimate program to ask for the gesture permission
and while user permits the legitimate application, the
eavesdropping malware can use the gesture along with
that application to trigger malicious activity. While such
attacks are likely, they still require the malware program to
constantly wait for, and synchronize with, the desired user
gestures, which may make these programs easily detectable
by the OS. Nevertheless, our approach still significantly
raises the bar against many existing malware attacks, a
prominent advancement in start-of-the-art in smartphone
malware prevention.
7.5 Other Explicit Gestures
To further extend our approach, it is natural to consider
other explicit gestures, or other ways to infer the gestures.
So far, we detected hand waving based on proximity sensor
data. The ambient light sensor readings can also be used
in this context, as shown in another recent work [4]. The
advantage of this sensor is that the hand would not need to
be very close to the phone. This approach also requires
accelerometer data to reduce false positives, as simple
phone movement may also trigger light values.
Accelerometer-based explicit gestures are definitely ap-
plicable for our purpose and some of the previously de-
veloped gesture recognition schemes [16], [29] might be
suitable. However, such gestures may not be as intuitive and
lightweight as the explicit gesture proposed in this paper
and may require a higher level of user diligence. Besides
accelerometers, other sensors that come to mind, and may
be useful for our case, are magnetometers, and ambient
temperature sensors. It does not seem possible, however,
to trigger a magnetometer without carrying a specialized
equipment or object, such as a magnet. Similarly, fluctuat-
ing the environmental temperature via human actions seem
rather difficult.
7.6 Power Efficiency
Another important aspect to cover in our work is the power
consumed by the sensors while trying to capture the user
gesture. Since the battery-life is one of the most important
factors to be considered for user’s day-to-day activity, our
design needs to be battery-friendly.
Our approach is indeed quite power-efficient. The ges-
tures proposed by our design are short (last only a few
seconds) and thus we only need to turn on the underlying
sensors momentarily. Only when the user requests access
to a particular resource, the sensor is turned on and the
(explicit) gesture detection algorithm is executed.2 Once the
kernel captures the required gesture, the permission will be
granted to the active application and sensor will be turned
off. If kernel fails to capture the gesture within a certain
duration, the sensor will be turned off and application
will be denied to use the resource. In the case of NFC
services or implicit gestures, tapping detection algorithm is
executed only when the NFC reader detects a nearby tag.
Moreover, our gesture detection algorithms themselves are
very lightweight and thus only require negligible amount
of power.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced a lightweight permission
enforcement approach – Tap-Wave-Rub (TWR) – for smart-
phone malware detection and prevention. TWR is based
on simple human gestures that are very intuitive but less
likely to be exhibited in users’ daily activities. Presence
or absence of such gestures, prior to accessing a service,
can effectively inform the OS whether the access request is
benign or malicious. Specifically, we presented the design
of two mechanisms: (1) phone tapping detection based on
accelerometer data, and (2) finger tapping, rubbing or hand
waving detection based on proximity sensor data. The first
mechanism is geared for NFC applications, which usually
require the user to tap her phone with another device. The
second mechanism involves very simple gestures from the
user, i.e., tapping or rubbing a finger near the top of phone’s
screen or waving a hand close to the phone, and broadly
appeals to many applications (e.g., SMS). In addition, we
present the TWR Android permission model, the prototypes
implementing the underlying gesture recognition mecha-
nisms, and a variety of novel experiments to evaluate them.
Our results suggest the proposed approach could be
very effective for malware prevention, with quite low false
positives and false negatives, while imposing little to no
additional burden on the users. The false negatives are
expected to further reduce significantly as users become
2. For the sake of our experiments, we have turned on the sensors
all the time. This was done so that we can determine the FPRs via our
experiments.
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more familiar with the underlying gestures, especially since
they are quite intuitive. In addition, the false positives can
also be carefully avoided in most cases, for example, by
detecting the orientation of the device.
Our future effort will be focused on realizing this ap-
proach in practice and further evaluate it with a wide
range of smartphones and smartphone users. On a broader
perspective, we believe that the gestures introduced in this
paper will also facilitate novel ways in which users can
interact with their devices and open up new opportunities
(for security purposes or otherwise).
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